Gainesville Attorney and an Injury Demand Letter

The below is a demand letter written by our Gainesville, Florida attorneys.  For more information about the injuries we handle, see a list here.

This firm represents the above referenced client for any and all causes of action for damages resulting from, or arising out of, the above referenced serious collision (hereafter referred to as the “Collision”) with your insureds, their vehicle, and our client.  I noticed the driver and the owner of your insured car are different.  Notwithstanding any other representations in this letter, ALL THREE of your insureds need to complete the attached affidavit prior to our acceptance of the policy limits for this claim.  See Subsection II. B. below.  In no circumstance will we settle this case without receipt and review and acceptance to our satisfaction of 3 completed affidavits.

Our client sustained multiple injuries and associated economic damages and pain and suffering. No further contact should be made with our client regarding this claim, and all future communications should be directed to the undersigned.


The purpose of this letter is to demand (A) securement and preservation of evidence; (B) all insurance information; (C) fair and timely investigation and analysis of this claim; and (D) immediate payment of any and all medical and other such type benefits pursuant to Florida Law.

  1. Securement and Preservation of Evidence

You must immediately preserve (including no repairs or alterations since the above referenced incident), maintain, secure, and store, and provide to us or make available for inspection any and all of the following that in any way may relate to the above incident:

  1. Vehicles,
  2. Black box from all vehicles,
  3. Tires from all vehicles,
  4. Parts of vehicle that may have fallen off or been damaged by the Collision,
  5. Photographs (all color photographs and/or recordings of any persons, vehicles (including those illustrating property damage), incident scenes, and otherwise relating to the above referenced incident),
  6. Repair estimates,
  7. Cell phones, cameras, computers, tablets, netbooks, iPads, cans, bottles, objects, materials, and items in the vehicle,
  8. Cell phone bills, invoices, and other such records,
  9. Text messages, Tweets, Facebook, MySpace, Linkedln, and/or any other social media account entries 48 hours before the accident and any time after the accident,
  10. Videotapes,
  11. DVDs,
  12. CDs,
  13. Audio Recordings,
  14. 911 Tapes,
  15. Pictures,
  16. Films,
  17. Scans,
  18. Voice Records,
  19. Electronic Data,
  20. Maps,
  21. Reports,
  22. Surveys,
  23. Equipment,
  24. Products,
  25. Fixtures,
  26. Floor Mats, and/or
  27. Items and evidence that in any way relate or in the general vicinity to the above referenced incident.

Any and all photographs, videotapes, DVDs, CDs, 911 tapes, audio recordings, pictures, films, scans, voice records, electronic data, and other forms of data must include, but not be limited to, all such items obtained or recorded 24 hours before the incident, during the incident, and 24 hours after the incident.

You must send us a copy of all repair estimates, work orders, and invoices for services relating to the repair or replacements. Again, no repairs, alterations, or changes should be made to any vehicle involved in this incident until we are provided with the opportunity to inspect and photograph them. Please immediately contact our office about scheduling a date and time for our office to photograph the vehicles.  Additionally, we must be provided with all data contained within the “black box” and/or access to the black box so that we can extract the data ourselves.

If you fail to secure and preserve each of these important and vital items of evidence set forth in this letter, we will seek any and all legal and equitable sanctions available against you. The destruction, alteration, modification, repair, or loss of any of the evidence demanded to be secured and preserved in this letter will constitute the spoliation of evidence under State and Federal laws. Consequently, it will give rise to a legal presumption that the evidence would have been harmful to your side of the case, and the judge in the trial may enter sanctions against you including striking of defenses and instructing the jury about this.

  1. Insurance Information

Pursuant to the provisions of section 627.4137, Florida Statutes, you are required by law to provide us with the following within thirty (30) days from the date of this letter. The statute requires that you send us a copy of the policy (including the declarations page and all endorsements and exclusions), documentation, information, and an affidavit under oath from a corporate officer, claims manager, or superintendent specifying the below information for each policy of insurance (including, but not limited to, automobile, motorcycle, recreational vehicle, truck, homeowners, farm, or other policies that provide garage or general liability coverage including, but not limited to, excess or umbrella insurance for the party or parties involved in the above referenced incident) that may in any way provide coverage for the above referenced incident. For each policy, you must provide us with the following:

  1. Policy Number of Each Insurance Policy.
  2. Name, Address, and Telephone Number of Insurance Company for Each Insurance Policy.
  1. Name of all Insureds for Each Insurance Policy.
  2. Limits (Amount) of Liability Coverage for Each Insurance Policy.
  3. A Statement of Any Policy or Coverage Defense that Insurance Company Reasonably Believes is Available to Such Insurance Company at the Time of Filing Such Statement for Each Insurance Policy.
  4. Name and Telephone Number of Insurance Agent for Each Insurance Policy.
  5. Copy of Each Insurance Policy, Including Declaration Page, All Endorsements, All Amendments, and All Exclusions claimed to be applicable.

In addition, you must immediately send to us any additional, amended, or supplemental documentation or information that may be discovered in the future relating to this demand.  You are required to send or have the insurance agent send this request for documentation and information to all insurers that may provide coverage. The above statements and information shall be amended immediately upon discovery of facts calling for an amendment to such statement.

Further, if you are claiming that any person or entity covered by the above policies were either not the operator or the owner of the vehicle, please provide the name, address, and insurance information of the person that was the operator or owner of the vehicle.

As specified above, the foregoing documentation and information must be supplied to us within thirty (30) days from the date this letter, which was delivered to your office as evidenced by the certified receipt card.

  1. Liability Coverage

With respect to your insured’s liability insurance coverage, we recognize that your company has a fiduciary obligation to your insured to conduct and complete a timely investigation and extend a good faith offer of settlement. Under the circumstances, we trust your company will do the right thing and we look for your company’s response within twenty (20) days from the date of this letter.

  1. Persons or Entities that May Have Information About Incident, or Responsibility or Liability

Please also inform us of any person or entity that may have any information about this Incident or that may potentially have any responsibility or liability associated with this Incident. This information may help all parties to better understand the facts relating to this matter.

  2. Demand

Of course, we would like you to timely get us all the coverage and defense disclosure information prescribed by Florida Statutes. On the other hand, all we currently know is that our client suffered multiple injuries as a result of your insured slamming their vehicle into our client and causing significant injuries and damages.


I am certain that upon receipt and review of this letter, you and your insurance company will do the right thing and advise our office of any and all insurance policies.

  1. Additional Requirements to Considering Any Offer

Further, before we are in a position to make any recommendations to our client (including but not limited to acceptance of the policy limits), as a material condition of acceptance of any offers of settlement, an affidavit executed by your insureds must immediately be provided and must include the following information:

  • At the time of the incident at issue, identify where your insured was traveling from and traveling to.
  • At the time of the incident, identify whether your insured was employed on the date of the crash in question; if so, identify the name of the employer, the employer’s contact information, and your insured’s normal working hours, as well as your insured’s working hours on the date of the crash in question.
  • Confirmation your insured driver was or was not in the course and scope of any employment at the time of the crash, or in any way acting on behalf or for the benefit of and/or the betterment of any entity, agency, employer, employee, or as a representative of any similar individual and/or entity.
  • Confirmation that your insured vehicle was not being operated in a joint venture with any other party.
  • Confirmation that the vehicle involved in this crash was not owned and/or insured by anyone other than your insured. If so, provide identity and contact information for all owners/co-owners and insurers.
  • Confirmation that the driver of your insured’s vehicle at the time of crash did not own any other vehicle. If so, describe in detail.
  • If the answer to number 6 above confirms ownership of any other vehicle(s), confirmation that the owner and driver of your insured’s vehicle at the time of crash did not own a separate policy of insurance coverage insuring the owner/driver.
  • Provide a listing of the policy number, policy limits, and insurance company contact information for all insurance coverage(s) that may exist, including but not limited to excess and umbrella coverage, available to your insured owner and driver that may potentially provide coverage for our client as a result of this crash.
  • Confirmation that your insured owner and driver’s net worth, excluding his/her/ their homestead, is less than $10,000.00.

For your convenience, I have included a draft affidavit for execution by the owner/driver. Thank you for your cooperation and we look for your timely response. If you have any questions or comments, please call me.

Top Labor Law Blogs

  1. BEFORE YOU SUE: 10 questions every employee should ask – By Robin Shea

Florida is an “at will” employment state, meaning that both the employer and employee may terminate employment at any time, with some exceptions, such as discrimination or retaliation. If you feel your employer has wrongfully harassed, terminated or owes you unpaid wages, there are several questions you may ask yourself before filing a lawsuit.

  1. New Exemption Rules May Be Delayed To Late 2016 – Posted by Bill Pokorny

New rules proposed by the Department of Labor for employee exemption under the FLSA will take effect sometime during 2016.  With a huge influx of comments regarding the new rule proposal, the DoL is likely to delay the rule changes to late in the upcoming year.  Employers are still clamoring to impose new policies to ensure compliance with the new rules.  Likely changes will include a raise in the minimum salary for exempt employees, which will be approximately $50,440 per year.  New classifications of employees, and/or raises in salary (to maintain exempt status) are expected by employers in the coming months prior to the rules coming into effect.

  1. Employer’s Policy Was Illegal But Enforcing it Was Not – Huh? – By Dennis J. Merley

A Texas hospital loses and then wins in federal court against charges of violations under the Americans with Disabilities Act.  A nurse, employed at the hospital took leave under the Family Medical Leave Act for two months due to personal medical issues.  Shortly after her return, she informed her employer that she would need to go on leave again, for a amount of time that would exceed both the FMLA coverage and violate hospital policy.  The hospital terminated the nurse, claiming that they could not accommodate such a long leave of absence under any circumstance.

The nurse filed charges with the Employment Equal Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and received a determination that cited the hospital policy created an artificial mechanism that violated the ADA.  The nurse then brought her claim to federal court with her EEOC “Right to Sue” notice.

The federal court ruled that the hospital’s policy did violate the ADA and was illegal.  However, they upheld the hospital’s termination of the nurse was legal because her request did not include a return time and the expectation of an indefinite leave of absence was considered excessive and not protected by federal law.  Basically, it was illegal for the employer to have a policy that did not provide flexibility to accommodate disabled employees, but the employee cannot expect an indefinite leave of absence, which would place an unreasonable burden on the employer.

  1. Study shows older female job-seekers have harder time getting hired – Sivertson and Barrette, P.A.

A research conducted by the National Bureau of Economic Research has found a substantial prejudice against older female applicants.  Studies determined that younger applicants received call backs from potential employers at a much higher rate than older applicants and even higher than older female applicants.  This is contrary to an older study which suggested that older male job seekers received the greatest level of hiring prejudice.  Discrimination based on gender or age (older than 40) is illegal under federal law and may be subject to civil action.

  1. Court Rules Light Duty Work Not Sheltered Employment in Florida Workers’ Compensation Case – by Friedman, Rodman & Frank, P.A.

A housekeeper injured her shoulder at work.  He physician ordered her back to work with a “light duty” restriction.  Her employer offered her a temporary position in regards to her doctor’s recommendations, which the housekeeper refused, stating that she would prefer to return to work after completion of her physical therapy in approximately two months.  The employer terminated her in response, citing that her refusal to return to work or call in as grounds for her termination.

Upon the housekeeper’s completion of physical therapy, she filed for partial disability benefits, but was denied her workman’s compensation claim by her employer due to her refusing light duty.  At a JCC hearing the woman cited that the light duty offer was “sheltered employment” under Florida Statute 440.15(6).

The judge denied her appeal, stating that the light duty job offer was reasonable and suitable under in her condition.  She was ultimately denied her benefits claim due to her unjustified refusal for suitable work.

6. – The gainesville lawyers of Massey & Duffy publish this legal blog.

Summary Judgment Response Filed in Gainesville Florida


            Plaintiff, Richard Gump, responds to Defendants, Open Arms Medical Center at Alachua, LLC and Brian C. Roberts’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 18] as follows:


After already having worked for Defendants’ as their employee for several months, Defendants approached Plaintiff and required him to sign their Employee Hiring Policy Agreement [Doc. 18] (the “Agreement”). See Plaintiff’s Depo, Page 43, Lines 2-9.  Agreeing to Defendants’ policy was required for Plaintiff’s continued employment. See Plaintiff’s Depo, Page 47, Lines 20-25 and Page 48 Lines 1-6.  The Agreement had two important and conflicting provisions; the first stated that Plaintiff’s working hours would be 42.5 hours a week:

I agree that my compensation is based on an hourly rate of $10.25/hr to work as part time employee. The working hours from 9:00 AM- 6:00 PM; 30 mins. Lunch break. Days of work Monday to Friday.

See Doc. 18. Second, and contrary to the first, it also stated that Plaintiff “agree[d] to the no overtime policy unless authorized and approved.” Id. Thus, the Agreement required him to work 42.5 hours a week but without the payment of overtime. See Plaintiff’s Deposition, Pages Pages 43 Lines 19-25 and Page 44 Lines 1-12. Having normal working hours of 42.5 hours per week is contrary to Defendant’s stated policy that “no overtime was needed and should not be worked” without prior authorization.  See attached Exhibits 4 and 5, Defendants’ Answer to Interrogatory Number 21 (e.s.) (“The policy was that no overtime was needed and should not be worked unless prior authorization was obtained.”)

Other employees of Defendants had already been deprived of overtime due from Defendants; so clarifying the Defendant’s overtime policy was an especially important issue in this particular employment situation. See Exhibit 1, Declaration of Plaintiff’s former co-worker – Emily Williams.  Moreover, at about the time he was terminated, Plaintiff’s hours of employment with Defendant were to increase after the Fall due to his working full time in Summer A. See Plaintiff’s Deposition, Pages 14 – 15, Lines 24-3 (“my original plan was to only take Summer B and work full-time Summer A”); See also Page 16, Lines 4-9. In fact, even before his Fall classes ended, his May hours worked show 35 hours worked per week.  See attached Exhibit 2, May Timesheet. Even prior to that time, Plaintiff worked 39 hours in a week and therefore overtime compensation was a legitimate concern. See attached Exhibit 3, March Timesheet.  Defendants admitted that Plaintiff “felt free to come and go pretty much as he pleased”, See attached Exhibits 4 and 5, Answer to Interrogatory Number 19.

Given the fact that other employees such as Emily Williams had been denied overtime pay due and Plaintiff’s hours were expected to include overtime hours (both by virtue of the Agreement’s terms and his availability from not having classes during Summer A), Plaintiff reasonably objected to Defendant’s Agreement as worded. See Plaintiff’s Depo, Page 43 – 44:

The first problem that I had was I believe it’s page 3, Number 1, where it says the working hours from 9 a.m. to 6 p.m. with a 30-minute lunch break . . .  if it was only a 30-minute lunch break, working those hours, that constituted overtime. And then just two more lines down, it says I agree to no overtime. So I told her I didn’t feel comfortable signing it, asked her if she could change it. She said if I had any problems, I had to take it up with Roberts.

See Id.  He was fired for objecting to the terms of the Agreement.  See Plaintiff’s Depo, Page 45 Lines 22-25 and Page 46 1-10. Defendants never proffered a legitimate reason for terminating Plaintiff because they claim that he quit.[1] There is no evidence that Plaintiff acted improperly, was unprofessional and/or deserved to be fired. See attached Exhibits 4 and 5, Defendants’ answers to Interrogatories 9 and 14.


            The anti-retaliation provision is a critical element in the enforcement scheme of the FLSA. See e.g., Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry. Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960). Under the provision, found at Section 15(a)(3) of the FLSA, it is: unlawful for any person.. .to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any employee because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under [the FLSA], or has testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding…29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). “The FLSA’s anti-retaliation clause is designed to ensure that employees are not compelled to risk their jobs in order to assert their wage and hour rights under the Act.” Lambert v. Ackerlv, 180 F.3d 997, 1004 (9th Cir. 1999).

“Unchecked retaliation subverts the purpose of the FLSA” and “the resulting weakened enforcement of federal law can itself be irreparable harm in the context of a preliminary injunction application.” Mullins v. City of New York, 626 F.3d 47, 55 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Centeno-Bumev v. Perrv, 302 F. Supp. 2d 128, 135 (W.D.N.Y. 2003) (“It is well established that the anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA is critical to the entire enforcement scheme of the federal wage and hour law.”) Here, the Plaintiff meets all three required elements to make a prima facie showing of retaliation because he engaged in statutorily protected activity and was fired that same day for his objections.[2]

  1. Plaintiff Engaged in Statutorily Protected Activity

Protected activity does not require specific reference to the FLSA. Burnette v. Northside Hosp., 342 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1133-34 (N.D. Ga. 2004). Informal complaints to an employer regarding wage practices or any conduct that implicates the FLSA qualify is protected activity. EEOC v. White and Son Enters., 881 F.2d 1006, 1011 (11th Cir. 1989). Plaintiff did not need to specifically reference the “FLSA” in his objections for the conduct to be protected. See e.g. EEOC v. White and Son Enters., 881 F.2d 1006, 1011 (11th Cir. 1989).

Case law interpreting the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provisions demonstrates that courts interpret those provisions in a manner consistent with providing protection to employees. According to the 11th Circuit, “By giving a broad construction to the anti-retaliation provision … its purpose will be further promoted.” EEOC v. White & Son Enterprises, 881 F.2d 1006, 1011 (11th Cir. 1989). The 11th Circuit has taken a liberal approach to what constitutes protected activity under the FLSA – even specifically stating that it includes complaints not even listed in the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision; in White and Son Enterprises, 881 F.2d at 1011, the Court noted as follows:

The charging parties did not perform an act that is explicitly listed in the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision; however, we conclude that the unofficial complaints expressed by the women to their employer about unequal pay constitute an assertion of rights protected under the statute. The FLSA in general is remedial in purpose.

(e.s.). Therefore, the 11th Circuit concluded that female employees who asked for equal pay had “filed any complaint” under the FLSA and those comments were protected activity. Id. Other courts have also classified as “complaints” statements far less definite than those in this case. See e.g. Romeo Community Schools, 976 F.2d at 989 (plaintiff who told school district that she believed they were “breaking some sort of law” by paying her lower wages than previously paid to male employees had “filed any complaint” under the FLSA); see also Snapp v. Unlimited Concepts, Inc., 208 F.3d 928, 939 (11th Cir. 2000) (noting that “the FLSA is remedial and humanitarian in purpose and that it must not be interpreted . . . in a narrow, grudging manner” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original)).

Having a policy that requires employees to work overtime but at the same time forbids paying overtime is clearly a violation of the FLSA. See Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d 894, 905 (9th Cir. 2003) (“It is axiomatic, under the FLSA, that employers must pay employees for all ‘hours worked.’”), citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207 (1999); Turner v. City of Philadelphia, 262 F.3d 222, 224 (3d Cir. 2001). Defendant’s conflicting policy of having regular working hours of 42.5 hours a week while at the same time having a no overtime policy clearly violated the FLSA because it is axiomatic that not paying employees overtime wages for all hours worked over 40 in a workweek violates the FLSA. This point is emphasized in this case, where Defendants have a proven history of not paying their employees overtime wages.

When this evidence is viewed with all reasonably interfaces drawn in favor of the Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s objections are far more specific and objectively reasonable than the informal and complaint made to the owner’s wife in Wigley v. Western Florida Lighting Inc., 2005 WL 3312319, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 7, 2005). In Wigley, one of the issues was whether Plaintiff’s “complaint to Donati’s wife regarding Defendants’ failure to pay her for partial days she worked” was protected activity. Id. at *5. The Florida Middle District court found that “Plaintiff’s informal complaint to Donati’s wife regarding Defendants’ failure to pay her for partial days she worked constitutes protected activity within the meaning of the FLSA”. Thus, Plaintiff’s objection to the Defendant’s Agreement and request that it be clarified to make sure he was paid overtime due was protected activity.

  1. Defendants Incorrectly Compute Plaintiff’s Damages

An employer who violates the retaliatory firing provision of the FLSA “shall be liable for such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of [the FLSA], including without limitation employment, reinstatement, promotion, and the payment of wages lost and an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). This is a flexible standard, and courts “have to exercise some creativity in awarding relief in retaliation cases.” Snapp v. Unlimited Concepts, Inc., 208 F.3d 928, 937 (11th Cir. 2000).

Plaintiff’s complaint and initial disclosures request damages in excess of lost wages argued by Defendant, including the following relief: compensation for emotional distress damages, an equal amount as liquidated damages and reinstatement. Such damages are available to a Plaintiff claiming FLSA retaliation. See e.g. Isaula v. Chicago Restruatn Group, LLC, Dist. Court, SD Florida 2014 (awarding emotional distress damages and citing 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) for the proposition that employers “shall be liable for such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate for the purposes of [the anti­retaliation provision of the FLSA]”); Travis v. Gary Community Mental Health Center, 921 F.2d 108 (7th Cir. 1990) (workers whose employers discriminate against them for raising FLSA claims may be awarded compensation for emotional distress and punitive damages).  Avitia v. Metropolitan Club of Chicago, 49 F.3d 1219 (7th Cir. 1995) (“The distress need not cross some threshold of severity to be a basis for damages.”); Lambert v. Ackerly, 180 F.3d 997 (9th Cir. 1999) (the court said it would only reverse the jury’s award if the amount was “grossly excessive or monstrous.”); 29 U.S.C. §216(b) (liquidated damages); Avitia v. Metropolitan Club of Chicago, 49 F.3d 1219 (7th Cir. 1995) (front pay); Bailey v. Gulf Coast Transportation, Inc., 7 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 968 (11th Cir. 2002) (interpreted the FLSA’s anti-retaliation language expansively as to the relief available). Defendant’s Motion fails to present any record evidence regrinding emotional distress damages, back pay and front pay suffered past the date of Plaintiff’s deposition, and the right to reinstatement. Moreover, even as to back pay, it fails to address the fact that Plaintiff’s hours of employment with Defendant were to increase due to Plaintiff taking a summer semester (Summer A) off to work more hours.

Defendants’ computations also fail to address the fact that Plaintiff’s hours of employment were to increase due to summer ending and that he was free to work “as much as he pleased” for Defendants. Plaintiff’s Deposition, Pages 14 – 15, Lines 24-3 (“my original plan was to only take Summer B and work full-time Summer A”); See also Page 16, Lines 4-9; Exhibits 4 and 5, Answer to Interrogatory Number 19. As such, Plaintiff’s lost wages from employment with the Defendant would be $448.44 per week had he worked the regular hours identified in the Agreement (10.25 x 40, plus 2.5 hours of overtime per week). In fact, even before his classes ended and he had Summer A off, his May hours worked show 35 hours worked per week and even his time from March showed 39 hours.


Plaintiff was fired for objecting to Defendants’ policy of not paying overtime without prior approval although Defendants’ normal working hours amounted to over 40 hours in a workweek. Moreover, his objections came from the backdrop of Defendants’ unwillingness and failure to pay other employees’ overtime they are due and from the full time hours both previously worked by Plaintiff and which he expected to work in the future – especially during Summer A when he had no classes.  Having normal working hours of 42.5 hours per week is objectively contrary to Defendant’s stated policy that “no overtime was needed and should not be worked” without prior authorization.  Finally, Defendant’s recounting of Plaintiff’s potential damages is flawed. Therefore, Defendant’s Motion should be denied.

Dated:  November 18, 2015


[1]  Defendants, as per the attached Exhibits 4 and 5 (answer to Interrogatories #9 and #14), claims that Plaintiff quit and was not fired. Thus, there’s no “legitimate reason” for terminating Plaintiff for Plaintiff to rebut. See Brooks v. Fonda-Fultonville Cent. Sch. Dist., 938 F.Supp. 1094, 1107 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (“However, in the instant case, the only offer of explanation by the defendant is that the plaintiff was not terminated.”). Defendant’s Motion at Page 8 seems to allude to the notion that Plaintiff was “confrontational” and deserved to be fired – however, as per the attached Interrogatory Answers, Defendant’s position is that he quit. There’s no record evidence that Plaintiff was confrontational or that he deserved to be fired.

[2] The Defendant does not appear to be challenging the causation element – nor could it. Plaintiff’s termination from his employment was immediately after his objections to signing the Agreement.