I. STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendants operate three businesses in one: a lawn maintenance, pest control and construction business. See Exhibit J (Answer to First Interrogatories), number 5 at ECF 24-10, p. 2; see also Defendant’s brochure attached as Exhibit C at ECF 3. As part of those businesses, Defendant installs light fixtures in customer’s yards, some of which are manufactured in California. See Answer to Interrogatory 16, at ECF 24-10. They use 98 trucks and vehicles in the business. See Exhibit J (Answer to First Interrogatories), number 17 at ECF 24-10, p. 5; Exhibits D and E at ECF 4 and 5; Exhibit N, Federated Mutual Insurance Company Vehicle List at ECF 27-1. They accept credit cards “daily” such as Visa, Mastercard, Discover and American express. See ECF 24-10, Interrogatory 17.
Defendant Timmothy is the company’s President and “responsible for all aspects of the company,” including its policies and procedures. See Exhibit J (Answer to First Interrogatories), number 23 at ECF 24-10, p. 6. He’s also its sales manager. See Exhibits L and M (Request for Admissions), number 16 at ECF 12 and 13, p. 2 and 3, respectively.
Plaintiff worked for Defendants as a “low position” lawn maintenance technician from July 25, 2016 to January 4, 2017. See Exhibit J (Answer to First Interrogatories), numbers 2 and 4 at ECF 24-10, p. 2. He worked mowing lawns, weed-eating and blowing properties with Defendants’ equipment. Id. He also drove Defendants’ vehicles. See Exhibits L and M (Request for Admissions), numbers 22 and 23 at ECF 12 and 13, p. 2 and 3, respectively.
During the pay period from December 28, 2016 to January 3, 2017, Plaintiff worked 24.25 hours for Defendants. See Exhibit J (Answer to First Interrogatories), number 18 at ECF 24-10, p.5; See also Exhibit B (pay stub) at ECF 24-2; See also Exhibit P, “Austin Jones Payroll Hours” sheet at ECF 27-3. On the regular payday for that pay period (i.e. January 9, 2017), Defendants only paid Plaintiff $83.74 for the 24.25 hours worked during that pay period. See Exhibit G (deposit records) at ECF 24-7. The reduced pay was due to a $162.60 for a “uniform charge”. See Exhibit J (Defendant’s Interrogatory Answers), number 20 at ECF 24-10, p.6; See also Exhibit B (pay stub) at ECF 24-2.
Under the FLSA, 24.25 hours of work would amount to a required minimum wage of at least $175.81 (24.25 x $7.25 Federal Minimum Wage). Under the Florida Constitution and the FMWA, the required state minimum wage would be at least $195.21 (24.25 x $8.05 State Minimum Wage). Thus, the payment of $83.74 was less than the required federal and state minimum wages.
On January 17, 2017, Defendants paid Plaintiff $93.91 for 9.5 hours of work performed during the pay period from January 4, 2017 – January 10, 2017. See Exhibits H (pay stubs) at ECF 24-8, and Exhibit G (deposit records) at ECF 24-7; See also Exhibit P, “Austin Jones Payroll Hours” sheet at ECF 27-3. January 17, 2017 was the regular pay period after the pay period at issue in this case. Id.
On January 19, 2017, Defendants paid Plaintiff only $100 of the $162.60 uniform deduction taken from his January 9, 2017 paycheck. See Exhibit H (pay stub) at ECF 24-8. The applicable pay period for that $100 payment, as per the paystub itself, was January 4, 2017 thorough to January 10, 2017. Id.
II. MEMORANDUM OF LAW
“There are two types of FLSA coverage to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of interstate commerce: individual coverage and enterprise coverage.” Vignoli v. Clifton Apts., Inc., 930 F.Supp.2d 1342, 1345 (S.D. Fla. 2013). “The question of enterprise coverage implicates both the Court’s jurisdiction and the merits of the case.” Id. “Defendants admit that this Court has jurisdiction over claim brought pursuant to the FLSA”, as stated in response to the Amended Complaint. ECF 11 at page 1. Although admitting FLSA jurisdiction in their Answer, Defendants still claim in their Motion there is no enterprise coverage.
- Enterprise Coverage
It is undisputed that Lawn Technical Company made more than $500,000 gross income. See Exhibits L and M (Requests for Admissions), number 14 at ECF 24-12 and 13. Moreover, it operates an expanded business not only of lawn maintenance but also pest control and construction business utilizing 98 vehicles. See Exhibit J (Answer to First Interrogatories), number 5 at ECF 24-10, p. 2; see also Defendant’s brochure attached as Exhibit C at ECF 3; See also Exhibit N, Federated Mutual Insurance Company Vehicle List at ECF 27-1. Nearly all, if not all, such businesses will be engaged in “interstate commerce” for purposes of FLSA enterprise coverage. Diaz v. HBT, Inc., No. 11-cv-1856, 2012 WL 294749, at *4 (D. Md. Jan. 31, 2012) (“It is difficult to imagine a defendant-employer in the twenty-first century that does not have employees who handle, sell, or otherwise work on goods or materials that have moved in or have been produced for commerce by any person.”); See also Leon v. Tapas & Tintos, Inc., 51 F.Supp. 3d 1290, 1295 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (finding it reasonable to infer that “goods or materials used in [a restaurant] moved in interstate commerce before they were delivered to the restaurant”); Lopez v. Top Chef Inv., Inc., No. 07-21598-CV, 2007 WL 4247646, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 30, 2007) (finding the first prong of enterprise coverage to be met based on a reasonable inference “that some of the goods used in the [r]estaurant moved in interstate commerce before they were delivered to the [r]estaurant”).
- Defendants’ Claim that their Vehicles are “Goods” Has Been Rejected by the Eleventh Circuit in Rodriguez v. Gold Star
As discussed more thoroughly in Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants original Motion for Summary Judgment cited cases such as Polycarpe v. E & S Lanscaping, Inc. 572 F. Supp.2d 1318 (S.D. Fla. 2008) and Bien-Aime v. Nanak’s Landscaping, Inc., 572 F.Supp.2d 1312, (S.D. Fla. 2008) to supports its argument that there is no enterprise coverage. See ECF 25 beginning at page 5. However, as discussed, those cases were reversed by the 11th Circuit. As a result on remand the District court in Polycarpe found enterprise coverage (after having found no enterprise coverage in the original orders). Now that Defendants realize those cases it relied upon are bad law (and – in fact – the good law version of those cases support Plaintiff) they argue this Court should not follow that line of cases, in particular Polycarpe.
Instead of relying on Polycarpe, Defendants claim at page 9 of their Amended Motion that this Court should decide whether the vehicles driven by Plaintiff were “goods or materials.” ECF 26 beginning at page 9. Claiming the vehicles are “goods”, Defendants argue, they do not provide coverage under the FLSA because of the ultimate consumer exception for goods. Id. Defendants argue in their Motion that “Since vehicles, like ships, are clearly a mode of transportation it would make sense to characterize vehicles as goods, not materials. . ..” Id. Defendants go on to argue that “the vehicles used by LEA were not for resale and LEA is the ultimate consumer of the vehicles they buy and use”. Just like with Polycarpe, Defendant’s new argument that vehicles such as the ones in their business are not “materials” has been rejected by the 11th Circuit in a case not cited by Defendants.
In Rodriguez v. Gold Star, Inc., 858 F. 3d 1368, 1371-72 (11th Circuit 2017), the 11th Circuit addressed whether cars parked by valets are “materials” or “goods”. There, the Court recognized the Southern District’s correct holding in Polycarpe that trucks used by employees were “materials” because they are used by the employees in landscaping in doing their jobs:
Cases relying on Polycarpe have generally recognized that tools purchased by the employer and used by the employees to perform services are “materials.” For instance, in Polycarpe on remand, the district court held that the trucks used by the employees in a landscaping business were “materials.” Polycarpe v. E & S Landscaping Serv., Inc., 821 F.Supp.2d 1302 (S.D. Fla. 2011); see also Castro v. Sevilla Props., LLC, 2013 WL 6858398 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 30, 2013) (suggesting that the flashlight, uniform, and cellphone used by an employee of a property rental business were “materials”).
(e.s.). The 11th Circuit went on to find that the cars parked by the valets in Rodriguez were not “materials” because those cars were ultimately returned to the customer – as opposed to the trucks in Polycarpe which are used like tools to perform a service:
The cars that Rodriguez parks are more akin to the clothing than the soap in this example. Like the dirty clothing brought to the commercial laundry to be washed, the cars are handed to the valet parkers to be parked. In both cases, the employees perform a service for the customer with respect to the items left in their care. The employees do something to the cars here, like the employees of the commercial laundry do something to the clothes. In both cases, the customers’ goods are returned to the customer after the service is performed on them. Neither the cars here nor the clothes in the laundry are tools necessary to do a job; rather, they are the “goods” which are serviced by the employees using tools (like soap in the commercial laundry). Id. Thus, the Court drew a distinction between using vehicles in a business (which can be used to establish interstate commerce) and parking customer’s vehicles in a valet service (which cannot be used to establish interstate commerce).
In the instant case, the vehicles used by Plaintiff are identical in use and nature to the ones in Polycarpe. In fact, both the defendant in Polycarpe and the Defendants in the instant case were using the vehicles in their landscaping business. Thus, pursuant to the holdings in Polycarpe and Rodriguez, they are “materials” – not goods. Defendants are incorrect when they claim in their Amended Motion for Summary Judgment that “this issue has never been decided by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeal”. ECF 26 at page 9. The Court in Rodriguez did.
Defendants also incorrectly cite Dunlop v. Indus., Amer. Corp., 516 F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1975) regarding the ultimate consumer of gasoline. As explained recently by the court in Acosta v. Timberline South LLC, 16-cv-11552, (E.D. Michigan, October 6, 2017), the use of gasoline is “incidental consumption” as opposed to the use of 98 vehicles. There, the court analyzed the argument and, citing in part to Polycarpe, explains why the proposition cited by Defendants is simply incorrect. Plaintiff is not attempting to find enterprise coverage based on the gasoline used in the vehicles, it’s the 98 vehicles themselves that were a substantial and indispensable need in Plaintiff performing his job and Defendants’ ongoing business.
Defendants Further Misapply the Law as to the Chemicals used by their Employees.
Even ignoring the vehicles used by Plaintiff in the Defendants’ landscaping business, Defendants also admit they use pest control products made out of state – specifically from Texas and North Carolina. See Exhibit J (Response to First Interrogatories), number 14 at ECF 24-10, p.4-5. This also establishes enterprise coverage. See Wells v. Armored Holdings, Corp., 8:17-cv-779-T-30AEP (M.D. Fla. July 20, 2017) (“Plaintiff could establish enterprise coverage by alleging that Armored’s employees regularly handled materials that had moved between states before Armored purchased them.”); Polycarpe v. E&S Landscaping Service, Inc., 616 F.3d 1217 (11th Cir. 2010) (“Congress added what has come to be known as the ‘handling clause.’ Under this clause, an employer will be considered to be an ‘enterprise engaged in commerce’ if it has employees ‘handling, selling, or otherwise working on goods that have been moved in or produced for commerce ….’ 29 U.S.C. § 203(s) (1961). We have already noted, this amendment allowed the FLSA potentially to reach retail and service businesses that were otherwise locally focused.”, citations omitted).
Defendants cite Wright v. Eagle Exterminating Co, 2010 WL 265237 (M.D. Fla. 2010) for the notion that “the pest control purchased by LEA is a good used for customer protection, and there is no evidence that LEA was not the end user or ultimate consumer of the chemicals.” EFC 26, at page 10. However, Wright relied on the same bad law Defendants’ original summary judgment motion relied on such as Polycarpe v. E & S Landscaping Serv., Inc., 572 F.Supp.2d 1318, 1321 (S.D. Fla. 2008) and Bien-Aime v. Nanak’s Landscaping, Inc., 572 F.Supp.2d 1312 (S.D. Fla. 2008). It also relies on Thorne v. All Restoration Servs., 448 F.3d 1264, 1265-66 (11th Cir. 2006) which was focused on the more restrictive individual coverage – not enterprise coverage. See fn. 1 (“Appellant Thorne did not raise the issue of enterprise coverage on appeal.) Instead of applying the enterprise coverage caselaw of Polycarpe v. E&S Landscaping Serv., Inc., 616 F.3d 1217 (11th Cir. 2010), Defendant is relying on old caselaw that depended on the old (bad) caselaw of Polycarpe v. E & S Landscaping Serv., Inc., 572 F.Supp.2d 1318, 1321 (S.D. Fla. 2008).
Moreover, the court in Wright relied on the fact that the plaintiff could not prove that the chemicals were made outside Florida, stating that:
More importantly, he does not contradict Robinette’s declaration that Eagle purchased these chemicals from a Florida company. In other words, while Wright claims he knows where the chemicals were made, he has no personal knowledge — or other evidence — establishing how the chemicals made their way into Florida, or where Eagle purchased them. There is also a lack of any evidence that Eagle purchased the chemicals for resale or that Eagle was not the end user or ultimate consumer of the chemicals. Moreover, Wright’s prior deposition testimony makes clear that he has no idea where any of the materials, equipment, or supplies originated from, or whether Eagle ever ordered anything outside of Florida, or that was made in another state — everything was simply provided to him by Eagle at the corporate office.
(e.s.). Contrary to situation in Wright, its undisputed that the pest control chemicals Defendants use in the instant case were made out of state – specifically from Texas and North Carolina. See Exhibit J (Response to First Interrogatories), number 14 at ECF 24-10, p.4-5. ECF 24-3 also shows that these pest control products were applied in customer’s homes by Defendants as part of their regular business (citing one of the services as “General Household Pest” and claiming a certification in “General Household Pest”.); See also Answer to Interrogatory 5, at ECF 24-10 (claiming to operate pest control crews) and Interrogatory 14.
c. Defendants’ Argument Against Enterprise Coverage Ignores Basic, Admitted Facts.
Additionally, Defendants’ enterprise coverage analysis completely ignores that they install light fixtures, some of which are manufactured in California. See Answer to Interrogatory 16, at ECF 24-10 (Q. “Do you install light fixtures? If so, what brands and where are they manufactured?” A. “We install low voltage landscaping light fixtures. Garden Light manufacture [sic] – Tampa, Florida; Hunter industries California); ECF 24-2 (advertising the installation of “a variety of light fixtures at customer’s homes that “bathes garden paths,” etc.). The undisputed evidence is that Defendants install light fixtures from California in customer’s homes.
Defendants also ignore their acceptance of credit cards “daily” such as Visa, Mastercard, Discover and American express. See ECF 24-10, Interrogatory 17. As noted by the Department of Labor in its Fact Sheet Number 3:
Interstate commerce includes such activities as transacting business via interstate telephone calls or the U. S. Mail (such as handling insurance claims), ordering or receiving goods from an out-of-state supplier, or handling the accounting or bookkeeping for such activities. It would also include the handling of credit card transactions since that involves the interstate banking and finance systems.
Thus, most clearly, Defendants are engaged in interstate commerce. Their arguments, its affidavit it refiled on again at Doc. 26 and affirmative defenses claiming they are not engaged in interstate commerce are frivolous.
- Defendants Misstated the holdings in Arroyave and Del Rosario
Defendants also cite Arroyave v. Rossi, 296 Fed. Appx, 835, 836-837 (11th Cir. 2008) for their argument that “being paid minimum wages ten days after the end of the pay period was not an unreasonable delay in payment and was not late.” Doc. 26, page 12. However, Arroyave only addressed the time period between the date the work was performed (i.e. the pay period) and the date those wages are normally paid (i.e. the payday). The Court held as follows:
Arroyave failed to produce evidence that would establish that his wages were paid unreasonably late during the relevant period. There is no dispute that Arroyave was regularly paid his wages ten days after the end of the pay period. Arroyave cites no cases that have held that a ten-day delay between the end of the pay period and payday is unreasonable, and has provided no evidence from which to conclude that ten days was an unreasonable delay in this case.
Arroyave v. Rossi, 296 Fed.Appx. at 837, (e.s.).
In fact, Arroyave supports Plaintiff; the Court stated that “While the FLSA does not specify when payment of wages must be made, the former Fifth Circuit held that liquidated damages are available under the act to an employee if the employer failed to pay wages or overtime on the regular payment date.” Id., citing Atlantic Co. v. Broughton, 146 F.2d 480, 482 (5th Cir. 1945). It is undisputed the that Plaintiff was not paid his federal minimum wages on his regular payday. The work at issue was performed beginning on December 28, 2016 and January 3, 201712. ECF 24-2. His regular payday for the wages at issue was January 9, 2018 (when he was paid the $83.74). Id. See also ECF Doc. 24-7. Defendants did not pay Plaintiff $100.00 until January 19, 2017 – indisputably not on his regular payment date for work performed between December 28, 2016 through to January 3, 2017. Id.
Defendants make the same misleading argument when citing Del Rosario v. Labor Ready Southeast, Inc., 124 F.Supp.3d 1300 (S.D. Fla 2015) – which is actually a Southern District case (not from the Middle District). In Del Rosario, the Defendant’s “policy and practice was to pay workers based on a Saturday to Friday work week and to pay workers within seven to eight days following the Friday of the preceding pay period.” Id. at 1304.
Both of cases Defendant cites involved the situation where the paydate was always eight or ten days after the work was performed. See Arroyave 296 Fed. Appx, 836-837 (“Arroyave claims that since his wages were always paid at least ten days after the end of the pay period, they were not prompt and timely, and therefore Rossi was subject to liquidated damages.”) and Del Rosario 124 F.Supp.3d 1315 (“Labor Ready has produced evidence that it always paid Plaintiffs within eight days of the end of the pay period.”). Defendants incorrectly claim that Arroyave “found that being paid minimum wages ten days after the end of the pay period was not an unreasonable delay in payment and was not late.” Defendants go on to incorrectly cite Del Rosario stating that “the Southern District Court found that payment of wages eight days from the end of the Plaintiffs’ pay period was not unreasonable.”
In the instant case, Defendants’ policy and practice was to pay its employees 7 days after the pay period in question. By way of example, again, the following is applicable to the work at issue:
- Work Performed for the Pay period: December 28, 2016 and January 3, 201712. DEC Doc. 24-2
- Pay date for that work performed: January 9, 2018. Id. See also ECF Doc. 24-7.
Defendants did not pay Plaintiff the $100 at issue on the regular pay date, January 9th – they waited until January 19th. Defendants had no policy and practice of regularly paying its employees 16 days after the pay period – in fact, it paid Plaintiff part of those wages on the regular pay date of January 9, 2018. Defendants’ reliance on Arroyave and Del Rosario is without merit.
- Defendants’ Taxation Argument is Nonsensical
Defendants also make a red herring taxation argument. Via the Affidavit of Anglea Hanville, she claims that “When all taxes and other deductions taken from Plaintiff’s pay were made, the net amount received by Plaintiff should be $ 180.27.” However, Federal and Florida minimum wages are due pre-tax. See generally 29 U.S. Code § 206 (a)(1)(setting the Federal Minimum Wage). Moreover, the argument also completely ignores the fact that Defendants taxed Plaintiff on the entire $266.75 he should have received on January 9, 2017; the $162.60 deduction for the uniforms was done post-tax. See ECF 24-2.
Regardless of how its taxed (and regardless of the tax bracket of the recipient), under the FLSA, 24.25 hours of work would amount to a required minimum wage of at least $175.81 (24.25 x $7.25 Federal Minimum Wage). Under the Florida Constitution and the FMWA, the required state minimum wage would be at least $195.21 (24.25 x $8.05 State Minimum Wage). Thus, the payment of $83.74 on January 9, 2017 was less than the required federal and state minimum wages. Moreover, even adding the January 19, 2017 payment of $100 to that sum still leaves Plaintiff short his state minimum wages due of $195.21.
- Defendants Cannot Prove Good Faith
As supposed proof of good faith, Defendants cite to “Uniform Program Policy” they filed as Exhibit C at Doc. 26. However, that document does not even authorize a specific amount of wage deduction; at the its bottom, under “Total Deduction Amount,” etc., those blanks are empty:
Total Deduction Amount _____________
# of weeks deducted _____________
________Weekly deduction of _______and one final payment of _______.
ECF 26, page 20.
Moreover, page 2 of the document under “DRESS CODE” only apparently applies when the employee leaves – but Plaintiff also worked 9.5 hours for Defendants the week after he worked the 24.25 hours at issue in this case. See Exhibits H (pay stubs) at ECF 24-8, and Exhibit G (deposit records) at ECF 24-7; See also Exhibit P, “Austin Jones Payroll Hours” sheet at ECF 27-3. Defendants should not be deducting anything for Plaintiff’s uniforms before his work for them even ends.
Moreover, no amount for the claimed deduction authority is listed; instead it discusses the “100% deduction of FULL COST OF RENTALS” (emphasis in original) – whatever that means. Defendants’ do not even say what uniforms Plaintiff supposedly failed to return (their costs, what they are, how many of them, etc.). It is Defendants’ burden to prove good faith, yet they do not even claim Plaintiff failed to timely return any of them. Defendants just unilaterally took whatever they wanted from Plaintiff’s paycheck, driving his wages for that payperiod below both the Florida and Federal minimum wages. That’s not at all “good faith” because there was no specific agreement (or even notice) about how much Defendants could deduct for uniforms.
Additionally, in discovery, Defendants never produced the “General Equipment and Facilities Policies” document they now rely on. See ECF 26, page 21. Defendants make it seem like that document is part of the “Uniform Program Policy” document they filed at ECF 26, page 20. Both appear to be simply labeled “Exhibit C”. However, unlike the exposed page numbers on their Exhibits A and B (EFC 26 Page 15 and 17) Defendants covered up the page 16 notation at the bottom of the entire copy of the Uniform Program Policy. EFC 26 Pages 20 and 21; See also Exhibit O, the entire Uniform Program Policy sheet at ECF 27-2. The General, Equipment and Facilities Policies form has no page number. Defendants’ Amended Motion for Summary Judgment makes it seem like these two documents are married, both being filed as Exhibit C (pages 20 and 21 of ECF 26). Its argument at page 12, ECF 26, even states:
Plaintiff signed a document indicating that he agreed that money could be taken from his wages if his uniforms were not returned upon completion of his employment. Please see attached Uniform Program Policy documents attached as Exhibit C.
However, those are documents are not married to each other. There is no evidence that Plaintiff was even provided with the General, Equipment and Facilities Policies document Defendants falsely marry to the Uniform Program Policy in a combined “Exhibit C”. Plaintiff signed only the Uniform Program Policy sheet, but attaching the General, Equipment and Facilities Policies form to it makes it appear that Plaintiff signed for both.
Finally, Defendants do not even attempt to argue they had reasonable grounds for believing their act or omission was not in violation of the FLSA. See 29 U.S.C. § 260 (2006) (“. . . if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that the act or omission giving rise to such action was in good faith and that he had reasonable grounds for believing that his act or omission was not a violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, the court may, in its sound discretion, award no liquidated damages or award any amount thereof not to exceed the amount specified in section 216 of this title”). Even the most basic online search would have resulted in Defendants locating DOL Fact Sheet #16, filed at ECF Doc. 24-9. Moreover, again, Defendant’s response to an interrogatory on the issue reveals the complete lack of any reasonable basis for their action. See Exhibit K (Answer to Second Set of Interrogatories) at ECF 24-11. Thus, Defendants failed to prove their good faith defense. See Mayhew v. Wells, 125 F.3d 216, 220 (4th Cir. 1997) (The award of liquidated damages “[is] the norm for violations of [section] 7 of the [FLSA].”); See also Barcelona v. Tiffany English Pub, Inc., 597 F.2d 464, 468–69 (5th Cir. 1979) (“We do not believe an employer may rely on ignorance alone as reasonable grounds for believing that its actions were not in violation of the Act.”).
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Amended Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied. As such, the court has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims as the determination of the Federal minimum wages due is inescapabilty intertwined with the amounts due him under State law. See Fla. Stat. § 448.110(3) (“The provisions of §§ 213 and 214 of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act, as interpreted by applicable federal regulations and implemented by the Secretary of Labor, are incorporated [in the Florida Minimum Wage Act].”) The legal issues are nearly identical because the state law looks to the federal law’s interpretations and the damages are overlapping.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND WORD LENGTH
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been delivered to counsel for Defendants electronically by filing the same with the Court’s electronic filing system on this May 3, 2018. This document has 4712 words.
By /s/ Paul Massey
- https://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs3.htm ↑
- Defendants originally filed this affidavit in support of their original Motion for Summary Judgment. It states, in part, that “Lawn Technical Company, Inc. does not engage in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or have employees handling, selling, or otherwise working on goods or materials that have moved in or produce from commerce by any person.” ↑
- Another bizarre notation is Defendants’ claim that one of them was not served on Page 1 of their Motion. ECF 26. Both Defendants filed an answer at Doc. 11 and Affirmative Defenses, including a request for attorneys’ fees, costs and “any other relief this Court deems is just, proper and appropriate.” Paragraph 2 of their answer even admit the Court’s jurisdiction over the FSLA claims. ↑
- See the Florida Department of Economic Opportunity at https://www.floridajobs.org/business-growth-and-partnerships/for-employers/display-posters-and-required-notices for the historical Florida Minimum Wage amounts. ↑